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
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# HOPE FOR THE CANALS!

SHOWING THE

EVIL OF AMALGAMATIONS WITH RAILWAYS

TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERESTS,

AND THE MEANS FOR THE

**Complete and Permanent Restoration of Canal Property**

TO A POSITION OF PROSPERITY,

UPON ITS PRESENT BASIS OF ORIGINAL AND INDEPENDENT

ENTERPRISE.

---

BY THOMAS BOYLE,

OF WOLVERHAMPTON.

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ENTERED AT STATIONERS' HALL.

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LONDON:

SIMPKIN, MARSHALL AND CO., STATIONERS' HALL COURT.

J. BRIDGEN, WOLVERHAMPTON.

1848.

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## SYNOPSIS.

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Amalgamations and their consequences—dismissal of carriers by railway companies—means used by railway companies to depreciate canal property—objects being amalgamation and monopoly—amalgamation proved to be injurious to railway proprietors; canal proprietors; senders and receivers of goods; passengers by railway, and the general public—no saving of expense to be effected by amalgamation—insight into the apparent reduction of freights by the London and North Western Company—instances of railway irregularities—restrictions and impositions the result of monopoly hitherto—faults of canal carrying—comparative superficial view of railway and canal working—original bad formation of canals—injurious consequences upon dependant collateral departments—improvements suggested—combination under the guise of competition—a carrier's ability of accommodation proportionate to the extent of his traffic—advantages of a general concentration of traffic—perfection of a carrying system—business of a carrier defined—carrier's disregard of the principle of the division of labour—violation of this principle the fundamental cause of the prevalence of errors—errors of delay and non-delivery proved to be remediable—constitution and establishment of the “Merchants and Manufacturers' Carrying Union”—objects;—the reduction of freights; prevention of errors; and the reducing the whole carrying system of the kingdom (including the railways!) to a position of complete responsibility to the senders and receivers of goods—Simpson's propeller for canal navigation—diagrams and description—rate of saving to be effected—general advantages—facility of application in connection with the “Union” above named—general observations—half-a-dozen reasons for joining the “Merchants and Manufacturers' Carrying Union.”

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## HOPE FOR THE CANALS!

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ACTIVE influences have, for some time past, been at work, and are still in operation on the part of the railway companies for bringing about amalgamations of railways with canals. Already many of these latter, who a short time since stood in independent and honourable rivalry, are included in the companies of their more powerful competitors ; while others have been reduced to such a helpless condition, that they too, are discussing the propriety of submitting to the same alternative.

It has become quite a rage amongst railway companies to endeavour to buy up the canals running in opposition to them. In cases where direct negotiations have failed, they have entered upon a course of operations not less certain, ultimately to accomplish their object, if timely measures of prevention be not taken, than that this accomplishment will be the establishment of a monopoly of the most powerful and arbitrary description ; under which galling restrictions and impositions may be enforced upon the public with the recklessness of irresponsibility ; and for whose correction, a tedious, expensive, and uncertain appeal to the legislature will be the only remedy.

The London and North Western Railway Company have, it is well known, thrown the carriers off their lines, monopolizing the whole of the traffic themselves, and retaining the more influential merely of the dispossessed carriers as agents, upon condition that they further give up their canal traffic whenever it is considered by the company to interfere with their interests. In pursuance of this condition, the parties so retained by this company, have since been obliged to cease carrying upon canals ; and the only employment they, therefore, now possess

as carriers, is in conveying goods to and from the railway. Thus, the canals are in a moment deprived of their most enterprising and wealthy traders, whose operations, together with their influence, acquired principally upon this once flourishing field of enterprise, and at a period before railways were in existence, are thrown into the scale of their monopolizing rivals.

The canal companies, thus disburthened of a considerable portion of their traffic, and embarrassed with the remainder, owing to the difficulty of providing at a short notice, efficient substitutes in the room of their most important traders, are thrown into dismay. Writers in the interest of the railway companies, industriously circulate the opinion, that canals must ultimately give place as railways proceed. Circumstances are artfully contrived to justify this opinion,—the railway companies parading the fact of their having reduced their freights, in some instances, nearly down to the level of the canals; and the uninitiated portion of the public, being led to believe that this is a perfectly gratuitous act of liberality, and intended to be permanent, look upon the current opinion as being confirmed by independent collateral circumstances, and the state of the canals to be, therefore,—*hopeless!*

Down go the shares in the market, the purchasers being principally railway proprietors, or persons otherwise interested in railways. Meetings of baffled directors and dispirited proprietors of canal companies are now held, at which present helplessness and gloomy anticipations for the future, are the only representations. Seeing their principal traders gone and their traffic diverted into the hands of their powerful rivals,—the temporary reduction of railway rates necessitating a further proportionate reduction of theirs—the depreciation of their shares in the market—no immediate profits for distribution, and but slightly grounded hopes of future improvement;—and further, seeing that the railways have insinuated their representatives amongst them,—it is not to be wondered at that the alternative should be hopefully entertained, as it has been of late, of the sale of their property to the railway companies.

By these indirect means the railway companies get rid of the necessity of *proposing* negotiations, and avert the opposition which the public would be sure to give, were the tendency and nature of their designs more generally understood. The overtures are made to come, as it were, voluntarily, from the canal companies, who, under the circumstances, must be content with very moderate proposals; and who are thus in danger of falling, a bargain, into the hands of the railway companies, to complete the establishment of the most powerful and unassailable monopoly, which the commercial materials of the kingdom could combine to furnish.

It is evident the railway companies are not amongst those who are of opinion, that the existence of canals is incompatible with the due extension of their own system, or they would not be so anxious to buy them up. It cannot be that they wish to gain possession of them merely for the sake of seeing them expire in their hands ; nor can it be that they have any fancy for devoting their surplus capital to the unprofitable labour of filling them up, in order to anticipate their own prediction of their falling, naturally, into disuse. It is evident their object is to *work* them,—but subserviently, instead of in opposition to, their own lines of railway.

The permanent utility of canals is thus inadvertently admitted ; and their perfect compatibility with the utmost railway extension, so far as the feeling of the railway companies can affect the question, is placed beyond a doubt. Amalgamations are, in fact, but means to an end, that end being, monopoly and its results,—arbitrariness and irresponsibility ;—and it will be shown, that not only the canal companies and the public in general, but the great majority of railway proprietors, are deeply interested in preventing their accomplishment.

A movement is being made to maintain the integrity of the canals, and to thwart the endeavours of the railways to obtain possession of them, for purposes of monopoly and self-aggrandisement. It may, at first sight, appear to be necessarily the interest of a railway proprietor, to further the designs of the undertaking in which his money is invested, against those of any other project ; but a little reflection will show that this is not the case.

The great body of the commercial public who are in the habit of sending and receiving goods, are more deeply and permanently interested in the rates of carriage, than they are in the prices or per centages of railway or canal stocks. To the permanent holder of stock, who is also a receiver and sender of goods, the difference of one or two per cent. upon a few hundred pounds is but a slight matter, in comparison with the difference of 2s. 6d. per ton, more or less, upon the carriage of his goods.

The majority of railway and canal proprietors being persons, who, as receivers or senders of goods, are more or less interested in the rates of carriage ; and the design of the railway companies being the establishment of a monopoly to enable them with impunity to increase these rates, both upon canals and railways ; it becomes a question, and one too, it will be seen, of some importance, to decide as to what course it is best for a person thus doubly interested, to pursue.

There are others, also, who are but singly interested, namely, railway capitalists, who are not traders,—whose whole anxiety is, as to the amount of dividends,—having no concern whatever in the rates of car-

riage ; and whose case in reference to amalgamation or the contrary, we shall first proceed to consider.

In the case of the London and North Western Railway Company, and others in similar circumstances, who usually pay 10 per cent. dividend, leaving surplus profits remaining, and whose boast it has been that they are able to do this from the receipts of their passenger traffic alone, there does not appear to be any reason, on the part of the mere capitalist, for desiring the slightest change in the extent or management of the concern.

If the highest dividend allowed by law be secured to the proprietor by the passenger traffic alone, or even by it in connection with the amount of goods traffic his railway at present possesses, of what possible use to him can be any further extension of the business by amalgamation, or increase of the profits ? It can only serve the purposes of the managers and directors, and lead to jobbing of all sorts, and oppression of every interest in the slightest degree antagonistic to the body possessing so much superabundant wealth. The proprietor has in this case, no interest whatever in favouring the extension of the establishment, and his motto ought rather to be, "let well enough alone." Further, it is possible it may do him a serious injury :—The canal proprietors, whose project is, under present circumstances at least, a losing one, will, in the event of amalgamation, still have to be paid their agreed rate of dividend. This can be done in two ways. It can be deducted from the amount of the railway profits,—reducing the proprietor's dividends ; or, it may be done by increasing the canal fares,—mulcting the manufacturer's merchandise. Thus, in the absence of an increase of the canal rates to enable them to pay their own dividend, *his* must be taxed for that purpose.

It is clear from the foregoing argument, that amalgamation *may* injure the interests of a railway capitalist, by occasioning the reduction of his dividend ; while, the event of *non*-amalgamation subjects him to no positive risk, as experience proves that all the opposition which canals can give to railways—even when worked to the utmost degree of perfection of which the system is capable—can have no sensible effect in diminishing their present prosperity, or retarding their permanent progress.

The mere capitalist, then, it will appear, is the only person beside the railway managers and directors, whose interest would not be *certain* to be injured by amalgamation and its consequences. He neither sends or receives any goods, and he consequently pays no freights, nor has he any concern beyond that connected with the rising and falling of dividends ; and even he would only be warranted in favouring amalgamation, in the event of a railway paying a *less* dividend than the

maximum amount above stated ; and in the hope of increasing that dividend through means of the additional tax upon canal freights, which, of course, the public would have to pay.

Senders and receivers of goods, who are also either railway or canal proprietors, or both, cannot *possibly* receive any benefit from amalgamations, and are directly interested in opposing them as calculated to be injurious to their interests under any circumstances of high or low dividends.

This class of persons have two interests involved in any course they take.

In the event of their favouring amalgamation, they may, it is true, increase the amount of their dividends ; but they are as certain to increase, in *advanced proportion*, the amount of their freights. Canals, in the present hands, are said to be scarcely paying their expenses ; it may be presumed, therefore, that the only way in which railways can make them do better, is by raising the rates of freight upon them ; and having full command of both, they will be enabled to raise and maintain high rates upon the rail also. This, however, as regards the class of persons under consideration, would be but paying out of one pocket in the shape of freight, the money, a portion of which, and a portion only, would be returned to the other in the shape of increased dividends ; the probable balance between the loss in the one case, and the gain, or supposed gain, in the other, being, it will be shown, seriously against them ; while they lose the alternative which the independence of the canals affords them, to the arbitrary and excessive charges by which this increased dividend is realised. Should they, on the contrary, assert the independence of the canals : they preserve to themselves this alternative, and maintain a wholesome opposition between the two rival branches of the carrying trade, whose operations mutually control and regulate each others charges ; and they lose, merely, a fraction of their railway dividends, to the extent to which the independent existence of canal traffic is inimical to railway prosperity. The question is one, therefore, of the relative value of the *nominal* increase of dividends as above explained, and the security against excessive charges, which the maintainance of an opposition is calculated to afford.

As regards the railway proprietor individually, whatever the amount of additional profit may be which is realised from amalgamation, it does not follow that the whole of it can be applied to the increase of *his* dividends, as the canal proprietors will be entitled to a certain *agreed* rate of dividend, which *must* be paid from one source or other. Supposing, however, that £500 railway stock pay at present 5 per cent. or £25 per annum, and that 2 per cent. increase upon the

dividend is, the effect of amalgamation,—presuming it to have a beneficial effect,—7 per cent. is thus made, being £35, or a gain of £10 per annum by the proceeding, upon £500.

The influence of railways upon canals is always of a positive character; that of the latter upon the former, chiefly negative, their great business being, since the introduction of railways, to endeavour to hold their own, and which it is well known they have not, hitherto, been able to. It is, therefore, scarcely correct to assume, that any diminution of the present railway profits will result from canal opposition. Rather than appear to argue unfairly, however, and in order to make full allowance for the probable effect of the canal improvements hereafter to be suggested, it shall be assumed that the depreciation in railway dividends, in the absence of amalgamation and owing to canal opposition, is the same in amount, as the profit in the contrary case,—namely, 2 per cent. reducing the dividend to 3 per cent. and occasioning a loss of £10. As regards the railway alone, therefore, the proprietor's interest thus stands. In the event of amalgamation a gain of £10 by increased dividend upon £500 stock; in the absence of it, a loss to the same amount arising from the opposition of the canals. His interest, however, not being *confined* to the amount of his dividend as a railway proprietor, but, as a merchant, manufacturer, or trader, extending also, to the freight upon canals and railways; his position in reference to this view of the case will be found to be much more serious, and to involve him in considerable loss. Instance the case of a manufacturer who receives 500 tons of goods per annum and sends the same amount outwards,—1,000 tons in all.

The preservation of the canals in their integrity, secures to him the benefit of the difference between the opposition rates, now existing, or the reduced rates contemplated by the system hereafter to be explained, and those which would necessarily be imposed by the railways, in order to make them pay, as before mentioned. Supposing the difference between this necessary increase of freight by the railways, and the contemplated further reduction by the canals, to be 2s. 6d. per ton, the manufacturer would save in freight upon his 1,000 tons, £125 per annum; or, in case he only paid freight one way, he would save one-half—£62 10s. 0d., and his customers the other half.

The account of a railway proprietor, under these circumstances, would thus stand:—

	£	s.	d.
Amount of loss by extra carriage, imposed by the railway company upon securing a monopoly of railway and canal traffic, 500 tons @ 2s. 6d. per .....	62	10	0
Less, gain by increased dividend of 2 per cent. on £500 railway stock .....	10	0	0
Difference, being net loss per annum owing to the amalgamation .....	£52	10	0

The interest of a canal proprietor, under the same circumstances, lies in upholding the amount of his dividend, without increasing the rates which he pays for carriage of his merchandise ; and seeing that amalgamation implies increased rates, how else can he do this, than by upholding the integrity of canals as a guarantee for the reduction of freights, at the same time improving them to become a wholesome and efficient opposition, and to be, consequently, more profitable ?

Merchants, manufacturers and traders, who send and receive goods as well as hold railway or canal stock, should, therefore, consider, before they countenance the amalgamations now so extensively negotiated, whether, by so doing, they may not be placing themselves in a position to "gain a loss."

As regards the public generally, it will be seen, that they are not less interested in opposing these unpopular unions, than the railway and canal proprietors whose cases have been considered.

Every person who travels upon a railway, and every person who either sends or receives goods or parcels, whether in trade or not, is directly interested in preventing amalgamations.

Do the companies contemplate an increase of rail business as the result of these unions ? Is it their object to place such restrictions and freights upon canal traffic, as will induce persons to prefer the high rate of the rails—in the same way that they secure high fares from passengers, by making the second and third class carriages cold and uncomfortable, and thus obliging many to travel by first class ? If so, and it is evident it can be nothing else, let it be understood, that increase of business necessitates increase of trains ; that increase of trains implies increased liability to collision and accident ; and if the public are satisfied to add to the present, too often, fatal peril of the railway system, let them, by all means, support the amalgamations.

The experience of every one shows him that the railway companies have, at present, quite as much business as they can properly attend to, in seeing to the correct and efficient working of their own trains. This business is not by any means worked to perfection, or we would not hear of the many hair-breadth escapes, and fatal accidents, with which railways have made the public so familiar ; nor would the commercial classes have such frequent occasion to lay aside their legitimate business to investigate incessant railway irregularities ; or, as a last resource, appeal to the sympathy of the public through the daily press.

Any further extension of railway establishments, under these circumstances, must, inevitably, be productive of further intricacy and confusion, and form, to passengers, a subject of the most vital moment, as involving considerations of life or death.

It has been seen that canal rates must be advanced by the railway



companies in the event of amalgamation, in order, not only to pay their own proprietors some increase of dividend—without which they would derive no benefit whatever from the proceeding,—but also, to enable them to meet their engagements with the canal proprietors, the amount of whose claims must be forthcoming under any circumstances. The general public, therefore, including the great body of merchants, manufacturers and traders, whose negotiations occasion the traffic by which these companies exist, must be subject to an arbitrarily imposed tax, in order that railway and canal proprietors may be paid an artificial amount of dividend, which the managers of the former have thought proper, for the furtherance of their own objects, to guarantee to them.

If it occur to any person that a saving of expense will be effected by combining the two establishments under one management, we beg to caution him against indulging too sanguinely in the hope; as we would wish to save him the pain of utter disappointment. No two systems can differ more widely; nor can any functions be more inconsistent with each other, than those required for canal and railway working. Separate establishments must still exist, and separate appliances in every respect; the only real union being in the department of management,—the members of which will be paid, as is usual, separate salaries from each establishment,—and no saving whatever will be effected. The only difference, or rather distinction, to be thus made, will be, that the railway managers will get two salaries instead of one; and this is the real secret of their anxiety for amalgamation.

The auditing and publishing of railway accounts, renders it necessary for managers to keep their *nominal* salaries within reasonable limits; so that any pretext to afford them an opportunity of paying themselves additional salaries, must be, to them, an object of interest and desire. The union with the canals exactly supplies this desideratum. The accounts of the latter, will, of course, be audited and published separately from those of the railway, thus, only one amount will appear in each, being but a portion—probably an exact half—of the total amount of salary received by each manager. Dividend or no dividend, the managers, at all events, will be paid; and to secure to themselves the highest possible amount of salary, consistently with the appearance of propriety, is the true, but hidden policy, of the endeavour to form amalgamations.

It may here be enquired, why it is, that the London and North Western Company have not given to the public an intelligible tariff of freights since the commencement of their monopoly. If they really *have* made the reductions which they are anxious to make the world believe they have, and that they have done so without any reservation, and intend them to be permanent, upon what grounds do they refuse

to allow the public to see and judge for themselves? It is true that they have had a form PRINTED which purports to comprise their goods traffic under five classes; but why have they not PUBLISHED it? or why is it that applicants are refused copies of it at the various branch offices, and are invariably referred to head-quarters? Can it be that modesty has taken possession of the London and North Western Railway Company, to such an extent, as to overcome their native solicitude about their pecuniary interests, and that, consequently, they have been content to do good without wishing it to be known? A word or two of explanation will decide the point.

A reduction has actually been made upon some descriptions of goods, upon the same principle, and with the same object, that shopkeepers often advertise some individual article at really a losing figure, in order to "get a name" and attract customers, who are made to pay upon the other goods for the sacrifice made upon the decoy article. The reduction which the railway company has thus made upon *a few* articles, is admitted by their own officers to involve an absolute loss; and being intended to serve but a temporary purpose—that of depreciating the canal property, in order, and until such time as they can bring about an amalgamation,—it would not, of course, answer, to PUBLISH such rates, as they would, therefore, be regarded in the light of a contract with the public, and the company would find it difficult to alter them when their purposes required. They, therefore, keep the lists prudently to themselves, issuing them for the guidance of the various branches of their own establishments merely; and placing it out of the power of the general public to produce documentary evidence in proof of the increase of freights which it is the intention of the company ultimately to make.

If reduction be indeed, the order of the day—real bona fide abstract reduction—why have they not extended it, in some degree, to the fares of passengers as well as to the freight of merchandise? The simple answer to this question is, that there is no real, bona fide, or abstract reduction intended. They do not reduce fares, because they have an undisturbed monopoly of passengers, and have no object to gain by it; they reduce their *freight* upon *some* descriptions of merchandise, to an extent admitted to involve a loss of one-half, simply to accomplish the subjugation of the canals; upon doing which, they can, by means of their monopoly, reimburse themselves at leisure, for their present outlay.

The carriers divided their general traffic, usually, into three classes; in one or other of which every description of goods was comprised. The railway company have divided the same goods into five classes, by which they have gained two additional rates. The highest general rate

with the carriers, namely, that of their third class, upon goods, from Birmingham to London, for instance, was 32s. 6d. per ton. The railway rate for the corresponding class, same distance, is, according to their printed list, 37s. 6d., in addition to which they have two other classes, which comprise nearly 100 descriptions of articles, and the rates of which are—fourth class, 45s., and fifth class, 55s. per ton; so that the reduction, after all, turns out to be no general reduction, but merely a removal of a certain sum from one class of goods, and the placing it on another,—in the same way that the Irishman proposed to lengthen his blanket to cover his feet, by cutting a piece off the top, and sewing it to the bottom.

If railway companies would rather devote themselves to the perfecting their own system,—to adapting their regulations generally, but particularly those relating to goods traffic, to the circumstances and convenience of the public,—to reducing their present wasteful amount of expenditure so as to economise the fares of passengers and rates of merchandise,—and to adopting means for the prevention of the numerous frightful accidents of which their lines are the scene,—leaving other means of traffic to stand or fall upon their own merits;—their conduct would be productive of national good, and would deserve the gratitude of the public; but until these objects have been permanently attained, the all-absorbing encroachments which they are now making, are but the sacrifice of the vital and pecuniary interests of the public, to objects of irresponsible power and personal aggrandisement of interested officials.

If direct evidence be required to show the disposition of railways to enforce restrictions and impositions in proportion as they acquire the power, the proceedings which have resulted from the attainment of of the very first step towards amalgamation, namely, the dismissal of the carriers, will abundantly afford it.

In the case of the London and North Western Company for instance; it would naturally be supposed that the dismissal of the carriers was imperatively called for by some such circumstances as inefficiency on their part, or of dissatisfaction on the part of the public. But was this the case? The public formerly were, at all events, silent, and presumed satisfied: they are now complaining, and their grievances are the more keenly felt that they find their remonstrances to be in vain. Influential meetings have been held at Birmingham and elsewhere, at which this act of aggression on the part of the railway has been denounced as arbitrary and uncalled for, and subversive of the public interests; and at which creditable testimony has been borne to the general anxiety of the carriers to accommodate themselves, to the extent of their ability, to the wants and wishes of their customers.

And how have these complaints been regarded by the company in question? Has any notice been taken, or reply made, or equivalent offered, for the loss of the numerous accommodations which the carriers had afforded? Has it been the care of the company that the circumstances of the public would be rendered no worse by the change? Let the press, but particularly the provincial press, answer. Let the numerous complaints which one hears passing from mouth to mouth in every commercial circle, dividing the interest with the momentous monetary considerations of the time, afford the reply.

Amongst a number of complaints upon this subject, which have fallen under our own observation, we insert the following from the city article of the "Times" of 18th Nov. last; not because the case to which it refers is one of more than ordinary hardship, but that coming from such a source, it will be entitled to more than usual credit and attention:—

"Complaints reach us regarding irregularities and losses in the conveyance of goods on railways. There can be no doubt that much injury is sustained in this way with which the general public never becomes acquainted, each isolated case of loss or inconvenience, although of serious moment to the individual, being too small in itself to enable the sufferer to create a stir about it, while the risk of legal proceedings, which would have been dreaded by the carriers of former times, is of course altogether disregarded by bodies who not only possess exclusive powers, but whose capital is reckoned by millions. One correspondent, engaged in a manufacturing business at Birmingham, writes:—

"Will you allow me to direct public attention to the gross system of irregularity now existing in the carrying departments of the various railway companies? Since the commencement of the monopoly of carriage by the railway companies, and between August 13 and November 13, we have had no less than 19 cases of irregularity, in many of which goods have been altogether lost. Complaints are attended by no good effects, and indeed in nearly all instances they are totally disregarded. The only course, therefore, is to request your assistance in producing the necessary reform, and in thus correcting one of the greatest evils the mercantile community can suffer from, namely, that of delay and uncertainty in the transit of goods. I must observe, in conclusion, that the majority of cases of irregularity referred to rest with the London and North Western Railway Company."

An individual case of irregularity has just come to our knowledge, which, as it presents a fair sample of the losses, disappointments, and annoyances to which traders are continually subjected, and may serve to illustrate the subject to the uninitiated reader, we shall take the liberty also to relate. We omit any mention of the names through which individuals might be compromised; for, although we do not mean to deny that individuals are frequently in fault, it is more particularly to the *system* of irregularity that we would direct attention;—that system to which, as controlling and regulating the duties of individuals, should frequently be attributed the greatest share of the odium, from which they only, too often, are the sufferers:—

On the 12th of November a box of eggs was despatched from Londonderry to a dealer in a town in the midland district of England. It duly arrived in Liverpool, and was delivered by the Steam Packet Company to a carrier, who delivered it to the London and North Western Railway Company on Nov. 15th. The invoice, amounting to £16 16s. 9d., was sent off from Londonderry on the same day as the box, and the cash, according to custom, was remitted by return of post. The usual time was allowed by the consignee for the arrival of the box; and application being made to the railway company without effect, a letter was despatched to the carrier in Liverpool to ascertain the cause of the delay, and an answer returned in accordance with the original advice, that it was duly delivered to the railway company on the 15th. Application was, therefore, again made at the railway station. The clerk who was in attendance stated he had information that the company had not received the box at all, but that an empty one was offered to them, which they refused; and, notwithstanding the consignee showed him the letter of his Liverpool correspondent, informing him that he had duly delivered it to the railway company on the 15th, the clerk persisted in his statement that the company had never received it, and is reported to have made rather light of the disappointment and loss, which it was represented its non-arrival had already entailed,—the market for which the goods were intended being lost. The consignee again addressed a letter to the carrier in Liverpool, informing him of this statement of the railway company, and requesting him to further investigate the matter at his end. The carrier accordingly called at the office, and learned, that so far from denying the receipt of the box, the company fully admitted it; and explained that it had been missent to a neighbouring town—Birmingham—in place of a box of butter, which remained in its stead. The letter which this individual wrote the consignee in reply, is so fully explanatory of the mistake, and so graphically expresses his own feelings upon the subject, that we shall be excused for inserting it *verbatim*, merely disclaiming against the propriety of the rather summary manner in which he would resent the mis-statements which had been made to his prejudice.

\* \* \* \* "Respecting the box of eggs, which I hope you have received "before this time (21st November) allow me to remark, I have had more trouble "and anxiety about it, writing backward and forward all last week, than with all my "other business put together. The railway clerks must surely be making a fool of "you, when they tell you I delivered them no eggs for you, but only an empty box. "I must say I felt very much hurt at such an insinuation; but, on reflection, I "thought it was too absurd and unlikely to be for a moment believed. At all events, "if I had only hold of the fool (I can call him nothing else) who said so, I would "not leave a whole bone in his skin—I would make him *know* and *feel* the difference "between a *full box* and an *empty* one. I called at the railway station here to

"enquire about it; they admitted they received a box of eggs from one of my carters for you, on Monday last, 15th inst., which through their own mistake they sent on to Birmingham, instead of a box of butter that I sent to a party in that town on the same day, and that as soon as they found out their mistake they wrote off to Birmingham to have your box returned. You ought to charge the railway company for the delay of the box and loss of sale during the whole course of the week, or throw the box of eggs upon their hands altogether, as they did not deliver it in due time; then you would very soon know whether I gave them a full box of eggs or offered them an empty one."

The box was not delivered until the 24th inst., being nine days from the time of its delivery to the railway company in Liverpool. The eggs having been paid for on the 14th, the dealer was obliged to lie out of his money for eleven days in all, nine of which his goods were in the possession of the railway company. His market and his profits were lost; his customers were disappointed, and his trade injured. His goods being perishable, had deteriorated in value; his time, and that of his correspondent, had been taken up in journeys to and from the railway in their respective towns to make enquiries, and in writing letters to and fro; and he had suffered annoyance, and, it is said, insulting treatment at the hands of the railway official. The matter still remains unsettled, as the subject of compensation has now to be entered upon, to occasion, it may be, weeks of further trouble and annoyance; and as the railway companies invariably refuse to pay more than the invoice price for anything they lose or destroy, it is easy to see that the unfortunate dealer is sure to be ultimately a considerable sufferer.

This case of an humble dealer, is preferred to numerous others which are at our disposal, affecting large and influential houses—in order to show the inconvenience and losses to which parties are subjected who have not the means to *enforce* justice from the railway companies, and who suffer on, frequently for years, before a single instance of their many hardships meets the public eye.

The carriers allowed their customers, invariably three, and frequently six months' credit; or, for cash at the end of three months, 2½ per cent. discount, and were not always very particular to a trifle of reduction. The railways require prompt monthly payments, made in hard cash, allow no discount whatever, and not a farthing of reduction. The carriers allowed their customers to warehouse their goods without charge, till it suited their convenience to consign them to their destination. The railways insist on their being immediately forwarded or removed, or impose a charge for warehousing. Returned empties were always conveyed free by the carriers. The London and North Western Company has laid a charge upon them of 3d. per cwt. under 50 miles—6d. above 50 miles and not exceeding 100; and 9d. for any distance over 100 miles. This payment they require in advance; and

if the packages are not immediately removed by the consignee on arrival at their destination, they are either destroyed or sold. Formerly, if any inconvenience was suffered a complaint was made to the carrier, who was at all times accessible and amenable, and some sort of answer and satisfaction, however tardily, was obtained; but who ever dreams of making a complaint direct to the official authorities of a railway company, in the serious hope of obtaining any bona fide satisfaction? A railway is practically irresponsible, and can *afford* to be independent, and to do as it likes; hence, the personal convenience of a railway official generally outweighs considerations of mere justice to the public. An individual makes a complaint of some personal grievance; it arrives duly to hand, and is listlessly scanned by the acting official. According to the nature of it, and if it be respectably worded, the respectability of the writer is taken for granted, and he receives an official acknowledgment of the receipt of his letter, accompanied probably, by a promise, that the subject of it will be investigated. Gratified at the promptness of the reply and the blandness of the assurance of attention, the correspondent fondly imagines his complaint will undergo investigation, and patiently, and perhaps anxiously, awaits the result. But if he were to know that the promptitude of the reply in such cases, was frequently, merely an indication that it was desirable to get his letter out of the way, as nothing further would be done in reference to it; and if he were to see how soon afterwards and how carefully, it had been folded and endorsed and put away, amongst the "answered" correspondence, he would have spared himself the trouble of writing in the first instance, and be saved the annoyance of ultimate disappointment. A reiteration of his complaint meets the same success; or, if he happen to possess sufficient influence to *enforce* attention, and an investigation afterwards takes place in reference to the compound grievance, it will be found that where so many are concerned, no one in particular can be charged with the inattention. His complaint, it will appear, has been lost amongst the mazy forms of official etiquette; his patience and credulity will have been exercised, while his grievance has remained neglected and unredressed.

With all these restrictions, and impositions, and drawbacks, it is notorious that the carrying business is not nearly so correctly done by the companies, as it was by the carriers. Delays and losses are more frequent, while compensation is more tardy and less recognised; accommodation is more scanty and restricted—complaints are more numerous—investigations more difficult—and general facilities less considered than formerly.

And if these are the results of the change so far,—if this state of circumstances be allowed to exist in the teeth of so much public remon-

strance, and while as yet they have not attained to the condition of total irresponsibility at which they are aiming; what will be their bearing towards the public when they do arrive at that state? What are the embarrassing restrictions which may not be imposed; and to what extent may they not advance their extravagant exactions, when their power extends over both canals and railways,—when they have acquired the exclusive privilege of the conveyance, not only of the persons, but of the whole goods traffic of the country?

Let the inevitable inference act as a warning to the public to look to their interests in time, before the contemplated amalgamations are effected; and the canal companies would do well, before harbouring the idea of a transfer of their property to their rapacious competitors, to try the effect of the introduction of improvements and facilities which have hitherto been neglected in its management, and which it is the remaining object of these pages to point out.

In proceeding to the consideration of this department of the subject, we shall pursue the course of an enlightened physician, who, in attempting the cure of a patient, first ascertains by a minute examination of the symptoms, the true cause and exact nature of the malady under which he labours; and having arrived at a well-founded judgment upon this point, the subsequent duty of prescribing the proper remedies (if it be a remedial complaint) is comparatively clear and simple.

The canals are not in a healthy state. They seem to be unable to support the separate existence which they have hitherto done. Their various functions are but imperfectly performed. It will be found that their decline is more owing to inanition,—a want of tone and spirit in the system itself, and a forgetfulness—partly arising from indifference, and partly from inability—to adapt their constitutions to the altered circumstances of the times;—than to any violent, external, or foreign causes.

The complaints urged against the canals are, the frequency of losses and delays, and want of punctuality in the delivery of goods forwarded through their means; the difficulty of procuring rates and general information; there being no published lists of rates or classes of goods, which indeed it would be impossible to supply under present circumstances; the uncertainty, partiality, and inconsistency of the carriers' charges, as the result of their being made out without reference to any fixed rule; the want of promptitude in the settlement of claims, and the rectifying of errors; the general looseness of system, and absence of unanimity or understanding amongst the various departments and individual firms of which they are composed, and the want of speed in the mode of transit. There are, it must be admitted, creditable exceptions to this state of things, both among the canal companies and the carriers;



but this is a generally accurate enumeration of the most prominent faults; and although it cannot be denied, that every one of these faults, with the single exception of the want of speed, may be charged with even greater reason against the railways; this will not form any ground of excuse in either case, as the evils alluded to will be proved to be the consequences of erroneous or defective arrangements existing in both systems, and hence, capable of improvement or remedy. It is this improvement, applicable to the general system of business as well as to the method of towing, which must be the means of raising the canals from their present state of depression, to one of ability to cope permanently and successfully with the railways.

No two scenes can present greater differences of character than the respective spheres of railway and canal operations. There is an air of assumption and parade about a railway which dazzles and deceives a superficial observer. In its general aspect it is the very type of enterprise, energy, and efficiency; although, upon a closer acquaintance, this appearance will be found to be owing, more to the comparative perfection of its engineering departments, than to any merit or efficiency of which its general arrangements can boast. The ease and rapidity with which long trains of carriages can be unlinked and changed from one place to another; the general promptitude of their arrival and despatch; the power and efficiency of the engines; the utility and noiseless operation of the system of signals; the substantiality of structure and condition of repair, of the trucks, carriages, and of the permanent way; and the velocity of the transit, combine to form a subject of wonder and admiration. But let the admiring beholder have occasion to book half-a-dozen parcels, on as many different days, to one or more of his correspondents in a distant town; and let him ascertain how many of them have been delayed, and how many delivered in due course,—how many in a damaged state, more or less, and how many in good order; and having occasion to write in complaint of any of these liabilities, or for compensation for his loss; let him mark the time and trouble it takes to procure the adjustment of his claim, and the reluctance with which satisfaction is ultimately, if at all, rendered to him; and he will have an illustration of the truth of the proverb that “all is not gold that glitters.”

The canal, on the contrary, is not calculated to deceive anybody. Beside the railway it appears the embodiment of quiet, plodding, undisguised sluggishness; and if this is not actually the case, it must be admitted the erroneous impression is not altogether without foundation. There is certainly nothing fast about a canal. It seldom changes or improves; and when it does so, it is only by imperceptible degrees. It is apparently the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever;—perpetuating

its primitive arrangements to all time and under all circumstances. Enlightened enterprise appears to have shunned it as an ungenial sphere for its operations, and the world in its march of improvement seems to have left it behind hopelessly on the road.

The loose and irregular system pursued by the carriers is, no doubt, principally to blame for the prevalence of this impression. That the canals themselves have been neglected to some extent, and their structural improvement almost altogether overlooked, can scarcely be denied. Why this has been it may be difficult to point out ; but the fact that no insurmountable difficulty lies in the way of this improvement, will be placed beyond a question.

The arrival of boats at any given point upon canals, and their departure therefrom, takes place at all hours, according to the numerous circumstances which are allowed to affect the speed of their transit. The miserable horse, with his fodder-can eternally fixed to his mouth, to save the trouble of feeding him at regular intervals,—half eating, half sleeping, half walking, half pulling, proceeds listlessly upon his journey of generally between 50 and 60 miles at a stretch.\* The heavily-laden boat yields slowly to his efforts,—now on and now off the narrow banks. The steerers with their assistants, pursue a systematic course of pillage of the goods committed to their charge, and such is the extent of the depredations carried on upon wines, groceries, provisions, &c., that there is much reason to suspect the families of such persons are nearly, if not altogether supported in this way.† Delays are frequently made at the canal-side public houses, where the time is squandered by the men in drinking ; the proprietors too often, it is to be feared, acting in the capacity of receivers of much of the stolen property. The unfortunate horse comes in for his share of suffering upon such occasions, for, in the endeavour to make up the time thus lost, the poor animal has to be flogged and goaded to the exertion of his utmost

\* The distance between London and Birmingham is usually divided into three stages thus :—London to Cowroast, 48 miles ; Cowroast to Braunston, 58 miles ; Braunston to Birmingham 50 miles.

† A short time since, a steerer employed upon the canal between Birmingham and Wolverhampton, was detected under circumstances which left no doubt upon the minds of those who heard the case, that he had been pursuing a regular course of systematic pillage of wines and spirits. On his arrival at the latter place upon the day in question, he was observed to be the worse for liquor, and on unloading his boat a cask of wine was found to be in bad condition and leaking. The circumstance of the leaking cask of wine and the drunken steerer, were supposed to be more than a mere casual coincidence, and an investigation took place. In his cabin were found several vessels—jugs, bottles—and, if the circumstances are correctly remembered,—a bucket either filled or partially filled with wine, together with hammers, plugs gimblets, and a small pump, fitted with a narrow tube for insertion into a hole made with the gimblet. The worst part of this practice is, that the deficiency so occasioned, is usually supplied with an equal quantity of water,—thus, not only is a portion stolen, but the remainder is deteriorated. The man in question, as soon as he heard that suspicions were entertained of him and a search was about to take place, went direct to the stable in which his horse was put up, took him out, mounted his back, and rode away ; and all the exertions of his employers and the police have hitherto been unsuccessful in tracing him out. Similar instances might be multiplied to any extent.

powers; and cases are not unknown in which he has dropped dead upon the towing-path.

In its construction and dimensions the canal is the same now as it was in the last century;—the locks, in many cases, more numerous by one-half than necessity calls for, and miserably narrow, generally about 7 feet to 7 feet 6 inches wide;—the bridges inconveniently low, so that in many cases scarcely to admit of the passage of a boat, unless exactly under the middle of the arch. Small tunnels are frequently met with, under which the boats have to be moved by a process technically called “legging:”—Two of the boatmen place themselves upon their backs on boards suited to the purpose, and fixed at the bow of the boat, and pushing with their feet against either side of the tunnel, move the boat along. A frequent complaint against canals is, that they are generally much too narrow throughout their whole length, and that their actual, is by many feet less than their nominal depth, owing to the deposit of mud formed of the soil which every ripple washes from their naked or but rudely-protected sides.

In some places large excavations may be seen in the banks, where the earth, having fallen into the canal, a two-fold injurious effect is produced. The displaced mass, being precipitated to the bottom of the canal, diminishes the depth of the proper channel; while the water, spreading into the useless area left by the displaced earth, further increases the shallowness. Surely it is not meant to be contended that the simple expedient of walling the banks throughout the whole length, would be more expensive than the continual repairs thus rendered necessary. The saving which would be effected by this proceeding would very soon repay the cost of its introduction. The water would be economised and deepened, by being confined to its proper channel; the trade would be subjected to fewer obstructions, as the water would not require to be drawn off so frequently; there would be less necessity for general repairs, and *when* necessary, they might be made of a more permanent character, at less cost, and with much greater facility. Little, if any, deposit would accumulate, and dredging would seldom be required. The canal might be kept, at small cost, in a generally efficient state, and it would be in a condition to avail of mechanical power in towing, as a substitute for the expensive and destructive employment of horses. That portion of the Birmingham and Wolverhampton canal between the former place and Tipton, was constructed in this way about 19 years ago; no repairs have since been necessary, and it has been in a most creditably efficient state during the whole of that time.

The boats for these canals have, of course, to be specially adapted to the peculiarities of the navigation, and the effect of the original error

is thus made to extend beyond the range of the canal establishments, crippling the operations, and preventing the improvement, of collateral and succeeding departments. They are, consequently, formed of the disproportionate dimensions of from 6 feet 6 inches to 7 feet wide, to enable them to pass through the locks above mentioned, about 70 feet in length, 3 to 4 feet in depth, and flat bottomed. They are about 20 tons burthen, and often loaded to within an inch of the water's edge, to the serious risk of their cargoes. The portion appropriated to the reception of goods is an open space, without anything in the shape of "hatches" for security. Every description of cargo, damageable by weather and otherwise, is loaded into this space, and packed, generally, considerably higher than the side of the boat. The whole is then covered over with a rude contrivance of tarpauling, as the only protection against the various accidents and liabilities to which the goods are constantly exposed. There are exceptions, but this is a generally accurate description of the canals and boats throughout England.

Now, if any intelligent person will seriously assert that this is the perfection of canal formation and working, or that canals having been originally so formed, do not now admit of easy and judicious alterations, and greatly improved methods of working, then may it be feared, indeed, that canals must ultimately go down before the irresistible progress of railways; and not even the fact of the anxiety of these latter to get hold of them, nor the importance which they attach to them as competing agencies, evidenced by the trouble and expense they incur in endeavouring to undermine them, will be relied upon as unmis-takeable acknowledgments of their still latent utility.

It is not, however, in the formation alone of canals, and the conditions in reference to the construction of boats, &c., which this formation necessarily imposes, that they are behind hand, and capable of vast improvement. The agency by means of which the navigation is carried on, is loose, disjointed, and consequently inefficient.

The canal companies are not carriers. They merely construct the canal and keep it in repair; allowing any carrier to ply upon it who conforms to their regulations, and pays their toll of so much per ton per mile.

The great number of independent carriers engaged upon canals, multiplies the number of transshipments to more than treble that which it might be under a properly regulated system. In addition to the termini of the various canals, which are necessarily points of transshipment, each commencement and termination of a carrier's stage involves another change, producing delay and injury to the goods. The cargo, for instance, forwarded from the manufacturing town of Wolverhampton for shipment to the port of Hull, passes through the hands of four

distinct parties, the stages being,—Wolverhampton to Shardlow, Shardlow to Gainsboro', Gainsboro' to Hull; where they are delivered into the hands of the fourth party, the shipping agent, by whom they are forwarded to their destination.

The amount of trade, more or less, which a carrier possesses between any given towns or points, and the fluctuations to which it is liable, are also causes of numerous and continual delays.

A carrier's establishment of boats, horses, &c., is, of course, always in proportion to the average amount of his traffic. He would not be warranted, nor does he in fact, keep permanently in reserve, any additional force to meet emergencies which often arise upon the recurrence of certain seasons and the fluctuations of trade. Nor does he, when his trade is deficient, send the same number of boats as when it is abundant; as it would not of course, answer, to send boats without goods, or with a less quantity than would pay expenses. The consequence is, that when cargo is either more abundant or more deficient than usual, delay is sure to take place. If more abundant, the carrier is deficient of the necessary means to accommodate it, and some of the goods must be delayed to a future time; and this abundance being usually the result of an urgent and increasing demand, the want of accommodation occurs at the very worst possible time, and frequently occasions considerable losses. The experience of many manufacturers and merchants of the midland towns will bear out this remark. If, on the other hand, cargo be unusually scarce; the carrier, not being warranted in sending a boat without goods, or with a less quantity than will pay the expenses to be incurred upon them, must wait the arrival of more to make up a boat load; and delay in this case, takes place at a time when there appears to be the least necessity for it.

Another circumstance, which would never be suspected to have other than a beneficial tendency, is, nevertheless, one of the most fruitful causes of delay with canal traffic, and is otherwise not productive of the slightest good,—namely, the competition for cargo amongst the numerous carriers! Stay, reader! We still claim to be considered the consistent opponents of monopoly, and steady believers in the opinion that "opposition is the life of trade," as the world at present stands. Competition for *cargo* were the words. This does not necessarily imply a competition in the *rates* at which cargo is carried, the fact being directly the reverse. The carriers at present *do* compete with each other in various ways for a share of the traffic of their respective localities; but upon the subject of freights they do *not* compete; on the contrary they *combine* to assimilate and uphold them. Meetings have been held at which rates have been decided upon to the various places; precisely as other trades combine to fix and uphold the prices of their

respective articles—the ironmasters for instance—and the rates so decided upon are adhered to, unless in such instances, as are common in all trades, where an individual secures to himself some temporary advantage by an unauthorised departure from the terms of the general understanding.

There may have been at various times, and in various places, that competition amongst individual carriers which results usually in a benefit to the public ; but when is seen, as it may be in certain towns at the present day, a number of carriers living in peace and quietness with each other ; whose conflicting interests seem to have given way to produce a novel specimen of “happy family”—where each holds his customers secure and undisturbed by the others for years ; the public, depend upon it, has need to look out for itself, as there is too much reason to fear that the usual result of opposition—where the opposing forces have been nearly equal, and the bone of contention has contained ample pickings for all—has taken place ; that competition has turned to combination, each having consented to recognise the claims of the others ; and that they are all acting upon a tacit or expressed understanding to “let each other live,” upon the common spoil of the public interests.

Competition, to the extent here shown, has an inevitably injurious effect, and impairs the efficiency of the canal system of carriage. That effect is to *divide* the goods in unequal proportions, according to circumstances, between a number of carriers. The consequence of this division is, that it weakens the ability of each individual carrier to send boats to any given place or places, as often as the public interests would require. According to the amount of traffic a carrier may chance to possess will be his ability to afford accommodation, more or less, in comparison with his neighbours.

A man who possesses but a limited trade, will not be enabled to load a boat for any given destination, say more than once a week. The customers and patrons of such a man must often, it is clear, have their goods delayed four or five days, or even a week, before they are despatched at all, accordingly as they happen to be given into his possession at an earlier or later period ; and as all such carriers certainly do procure customers who commit goods to their charge, it follows that such delays must often be experienced, and that many persons are working under the disadvantage here set forth. A carrier who possessed a greater share of traffic to the same place, would be enabled to increase his number of boats, say to two per week ; hence, there would be an advantage in dealing with such a man, did other circumstances permit. A merchant, manufacturer, or trader, usually confines himself exclusively to one individual carrier. This party may be enabled

to afford him an advantage on some particular route, while he places him at a disadvantage upon some other ; but, as carriers generally are situated in this respect, somewhat alike, and as the sender of goods has usually an account-current with his carrier, he cannot change in a moment from one to another as each may offer a particular advantage, but prefers to take the rough and the smooth in exclusive connection with *one*, rather than lose the advantage of his account-current, and incur the trouble which each separate transaction would entail, in the absence of a settled agreement.

Did it so happen that one carrier possessed the whole of the traffic which is now divided among so many, it is evident he would be enabled to despatch boats to the various places, much oftener than any individual can do under present circumstances, as well as afford a general reduction of freights ; and that, in proportion to the extent of his traffic to the various places, would be the diminution of the liability to delay to these places respectively. And provided such a person could be submitted to a wholesome control, so as to prevent the *possibility* of his using his privilege as a monopoly ;—could he be placed in such a position of *responsibility* to the owners and senders of goods, that they could at any time operate as a spur to his flagging energies,—influence his arrangements in furtherance of their own interests, and regulate his charges to that point of reduction which would be compatible with the proper performance of his duties ; this would be the perfection of a carrying system ;—avoiding the expenditure of separate establishments—reducing the general charges for the transmission of goods—facilitating a unanimity of understanding—ensuring the general advantages to be derived from a concentration of resources ; and all under the complete direction and control of *those who would feed it with their traffic*.

The reader will have an opportunity afforded him in the succeeding pages of judging for himself, whether such a system be capable of practical realisation ; but for the present we must follow up the causes of the inefficiency of canals, preparatory to suggesting the means for their permanent improvement and prosperity.

It is not upon all occasions that the internal arrangements of carriers for the performance of their own immediate business, will be found to exhibit the perfection of administrative capacity or wisdom. On the contrary, here exist sufficient causes of error and inefficiency to render nugatory the very perfection of canal formation or government did it exist, and to paralyse any amount of exertion, in other quarters, for the maintenance or improvement of the traffic.

The whole business of a carrier, as such, may be comprised under three heads ;—receiving—transmitting,—and delivering goods ; and the general reader, who considers, probably for the first time, the simplicity

of this duty, will be at a loss to account for the number of delays and errors, and the prevailing amount of inefficiency, both upon canals and railways.

It is difficult to go minutely into detail upon this head, without compromising or appearing to compromise, particular establishments, which we have no desire to do. We must be content, therefore, to remark generally, that these natural divisions of the carrying trade are not clearly marked, and separately followed out. The great principle of the "division of labour," is no where more applicable or necessary than here; nor is there any place, or trade, where its simplifying and efficiency-producing conditions are more utterly disregarded.

A compliance with this principle would require, that the departments above mentioned should be kept separate and distinct in themselves, and so arranged, that there would be no clashing of inconsistent duties; that one point should not be neglected while another was being attended to, and that each minute detail was provided for by the system before hand, so as not to be liable to frequent intervals of neglect or delay, but maintained in continual and consistent operation.

It is seldom, indeed, that this plan is followed out in the various carrying establishments. Instead of appointing separate official heads, with auxiliary hands, exclusively to the various departments, and afterwards connecting these departments under the supervision of one more general head; instances are seen in which any one official has general duties to perform, connected more or less, with each department; and inasmuch as each department must necessarily have a separate and distinct sphere for its operations, and these operations are, for the most part, different in their character, and cotemporary in their working; this apportionment of duties involves the inconsistency of requiring a person to attend to two things, in different places, at the same time. This cannot be done, and hence the number of errors which are committed by the carriers. A clerk employed upon this plan is attending, for instance, to the loading or unloading of a boat in one place, while a quantity of goods offer for reception in another. Should he leave his immediate employment to attend to the receipt department, the unloading or loading must stop till he returns; or, if continued in his absence, is liable to fall into error for want of his necessary supervision,—and he loses time, moreover, in walking to and fro between the seats of both departments: or, should he neglect the receipt department in order first to finish his present engagement—and he must do either one or the other,—that department is left, for the time being, to take care of itself; and no wonder that goods should go astray, and that disputes should arise as to losses and non-deliveries. How does it happen that goods duly sent off from their first place of de-



parture, are so frequently delayed at intermediate places, and either altogether lost, or delivered only after much investigation and trouble upon the part of all connected with them? Why, precisely from this cause:—It is found that the goods, although forwarded in the boat, are often omitted to be entered upon the invoice; hence they are overlooked at the place of transshipment or destination. Or, they may be correctly entered upon the invoice, but omitted to be loaded into the boat, or accidentally placed in the wrong boat, and sent to a point the very opposite to their proper destination; or any of the thousand ways in which goods may go astray may happen,—in the absence of an efficient and *steadily applied* check upon the various departments.

It may be stated that errors committed in this way, in one place, are discovered and corrected in another. That this is the case, to some extent, is not meant to be denied; but that it is not completely effectual all experience proves. Take an instance:—A manufacturer in Wolverhampton or Manchester sends a quantity of goods to a customer in London, which have not been delivered in due course, and an investigation takes place. They are found, as is often the case, lying upon the carrier's wharf in Birmingham, where they have been delayed. Let it be insisted upon to know the particular cause of the delay. It will appear that one or other of the circumstances above mentioned has happened to them, or some similar circumstance arising from the same cause,—that of mixing up the various departments of the business, and combining inconsistent functions in the person of one individual. How else is it possible for such errors to arise? Were the various departments of a carrier's establishment properly defined, and each department committed to the exclusive supervision of a properly qualified head,—himself responsible to a higher and more general supervision; and were each minute detail fitted with an agency which could keep it in regular and continual operation; where would be the *possibility* of going wrong with impunity? It may, indeed, be contended that there would be an abstract possibility; but this can only be made out upon the presumption that all the parts would *connive* at the commission of errors, which they *did not want* to check.

Each department would, under such a system efficiently administered, infallibly check the other; and a mistake would seldom, if ever, run the gauntlet of the various branches of an establishment so as to reach the public; much less, involve them in continual hot water with their carriage and carriers, or occasion such instances of complaint as that inserted from the "Times," or the numerous others which could if necessary be brought forward, in which the same number of irregularities have transpired in as many weeks, as there are months in the case alluded to.

Enough, it is hoped, has been said to enable the general reader to concur in the opinion, that the system of internal management adopted by the carriers, is one of the main causes of the prevalence of errors. There will be the less necessity for enlarging further upon this subject at present, as the writer has in preparation, a treatise upon the general subject of carrying, which will shortly be published; principally designed to aid him in the developement of his plan for the improvement of the system of carriage throughout the kingdom; which plan, he shall now proceed, with confidence to submit.

Suffering under the effects of an unusual general depression, partly artificial—produced by the money and manœuvres of the railways; and partly natural—arising from their own general inefficiency,—the canals would not, at present, appear to warrant any very considerable expenditure of money upon them, and it would be in vain to urge it singly, as a means for their restoration. To explain the extent to which this depression was attributable to artificial causes, and to exhibit the possibility of improving the method of conducting the traffic, so as to give good grounds of *hope* of ultimate prosperity; appeared to be the means most likely to procure the expenditure by the respective companies, of the necessary monies for their fundamental improvement.

The first of these objects was temporarily answered by the publication some months since by the writer, of a couple of circulars upon the subject; and it will, he trusts, be further satisfactorily served by the present means.

Considerable progress has also been made in the establishment of a method for improving the general system of the transmission of goods; which, by maintaining the canal in its independent state, and rendering it (all things considered) as eligible a medium for the transmission of goods as the railway, will call back the goods to their original channels; and the railways, disappointed of their wished-for monopoly, and feeling the drain of goods produced by the vigorous opposition of their once prostrate rivals—fighting them with their newly-acquired weapons of economy and efficiency—will be reduced to a position of responsibility to the public; who will secure to themselves the peculiar benefit derivable from both systems, and an easy and complete power of controlling either at pleasure.

The plan is the result of many years' practical experience of various systems of inland carriage, and of a deep and mature consideration of the details of the business, and of the causes of errors. We are persuaded that mismanagement,—commencing in the formation of the establishments,—continued through the minutest details,—pervading the general system,—and inherent in the very construction of the canals themselves,—is, unequivocally, more deeply concerned in the production

of their present state of depression, than the operation of railways through any peculiar advantages they may be supposed to possess ; and if the canals are but true to their own interests ; if the various departments agree to give “ a long pull, a strong pull, and a pull altogether,” we are further persuaded that they may still flourish as in the palmiest days of their prosperity ; standing in their original integrity, and in side by side rivalry with the now dreaded railways.

The want of connection between the various carrying establishments, and the loose and erroneous nature of their internal arrangements, being the *immediate* causes of inefficiency and error, it became a primary and indispensable duty to systematise the whole upon a general and intelligible principle.

How to acquire the power to do this was the point of difficulty. No representations to the carriers would induce them to adhere consistently to any general plan ; and even if they did, its tendency would be towards a monopoly, from which the public interests would suffer. The canal companies had no power to enforce general regulations among the carriers in reference to each other ; and they had moreover great need of a much closer understanding among themselves. The owners and senders of the goods were the only parties who could call such a power into existence ;—this they could do by combination ;—and having created such a power, they could delegate it to any person they thought proper, to be used for their advantage,—retaining perfect command over it, to restrict it at any moment they pleased ; or, should it be abused in one hand, to remove it to another.

It was accordingly decided to call upon the receivers and senders of goods to combine, under the title of the “ Merchants and Manufacturers’ Carrying Union,” to concentrate their goods and place them at the command of a party, who, not being a carrier himself, but identified with their interests and acting for them alone, would dispose of them to that carrier who offered the body the fairest advantages.

In pursuance of this object, the writer formed a branch establishment in Wolverhampton, under the name of “ Thomas Boyle and Company.” A canvass of the principal merchants, manufacturers and factors took place, who were requested to sign a requisition to the following effect ; which they not only did with alacrity, but in almost every instance, the most unqualified admiration of the utility, simplicity, and efficiency of the plan was cordially expressed :—

MERCHANTS AND MANUFACTURERS’ CARRYING UNION,

*For procuring the reduction of freights, and improving the general system of the transmission of Goods.*

We the undersigned, hereby pledge ourselves to co-operate with the above Union, by sending the whole of our canal goods through those carriers only who may

be nominated by the projectors as offering the fairest advantages to the general body; and thus form a means of checking the contemplated monopoly of the railways, and ensure to ourselves meanwhile, the following important desiderata:—

- I.—The securing the greatest practicable reduction of freights.
- II.—The enforcing the correct and punctual delivery of goods by the carriers.
- III.—The delivery of empties free, and as regularly and punctually as full packages.
- IV.—Providing and publishing lists of freights and general information.
- V.—Facilitating investigations as to disputed points, and procuring their speedy and advantageous settlement.

VI.—Providing for the proper clearance of goods intended for shipment, and obtaining from the shipping agents a reduction of the charges for commission, &c.

VII.—Bargaining for reduced channel and foreign freights: and generally, the securing to the goods, from place of departure to destination, that care and attention to every thing concerning them, which a direct personal interest can alone ensure.

These advantages are offered to the mercantile community not only *without the slightest charge*, but consistently with an obvious *saving* of present expenses, and as the result merely of their *combining* for the general good.

THOS. BOYLE AND COMPANY.

Office, No. 5, King-street, Wolverhampton.

So that when this system shall have become general throughout the kingdom, and other communities shall have experienced the advantages of a method of transmission, as completely under their guidance and control as if each man had been his own carrier; the town of Wolverhampton will be remembered as the place in which it received its first encouragement and impulse; where the practical foresight was contained, to perceive the merits of a system as much in advance of present notions, as was that noble and generous movement, whose advocacy their cherished champion in the legislature had maintained singly for years; whose merits have since been acknowledged by the unanimous voice of the nation, and now form a portion of the wisdom of its laws.

The aggregate amount of patronage obtained by these means, is offered to that carrier, belonging to the locality, who proposes to do it on the most advantageous terms. Succeeding carriers on the various lines are arranged with in the same way; and not only the concentrated traffic of their respective localities, but the accumulations of distant and neighbouring carriers, are made to flow through their hands.

It is proposed to fix the central establishment in Birmingham; from which place shall proceed at first, four lines, to the ports of London, Liverpool, Bristol and Hull. Carriers being appointed by this central establishment in each town on the route to these places, and shipping-agents in connection with them in the various ports; all goods, to and from the centre and the coast, will be transmitted through their means.

The quantity of traffic which such carriers and agents will, by these means possess, will enable them to convey it more cheaply than they could when they had but a portion of it in connection with a number of rivals. They will be warranted in making permanent and extensive arrangements for the proper accommodation of the traffic, which they could not have attempted under their previous circumstances. They will be under the control, and subject to a responsibility to the central establishment ; itself responsible to those from whom it derives its power, and who can limit or remove it at any moment they please. Reasonable conveniences and improvements which might otherwise be neglected, can be insisted on by the public with the influence of an authority which it will not be prudent either to gainsay or slight. Claims and disputes between the public and the carriers which are now often inconveniently protracted, or sought to be altogether evaded by the latter, can, by the intervention of this authority, be brought to a just and immediate settlement. Rates of freight will be accurately defined and fixed, and printed lists drawn up and published, containing the charges for the various descriptions of goods from the centre to each intermediate place in detail, and the gross freights to the furthest destinations. An intimate connection and understanding will be promoted between the various links of the trade, by which greater efficiency will be ensured and many delays avoided. The treatise upon the subject of carrying already alluded to, will be presented gratuitously to each individual carrier ; who will be assisted in case of necessity, in the economical and efficient formation or improvement of the internal arrangements of his establishment ; and the *modus operandi* be made as nearly alike as possible, everywhere throughout the system.

In short, the claims and advantages of the proposed plan are too many to be formally enumerated ; and a very slight consideration on the part of the reader will satisfy him, that the more the matter is investigated, the more interminable they become. For a further epitome of arguments in support of the system, see the "Half-dozen Reasons," inserted at the end, and which were drawn up in the first instance to assist the canvas in Wolverhampton.

Nor is the important subject of the system of towing to remain a *hopeless* one amongst the surrounding improvements.

The attention of the writer has been long and anxiously directed to this department, as the only one in which he could not effect the necessary improvement and economy. He has investigated the claims of propellers for canals *ad infinitum*, and has thought much for himself upon the matter ; but, till recently, without any successful or even hopeful result.

On the 16th of November, however, he received an invitation from Mr. T. B. Simpson, of the Albion Hotel, Covent Garden, to be present at Deptford, to witness an experiment he was about to make, under the auspices of the Earl of Dundonald, with a propeller adapted for canal navigation. He availed himself of the privilege, and witnessed what he conceives to be the realisation of his grand desideratum. The following account of the experiment appeared in portions of the impressions of the "Times," of the two succeeding days; in reference to which it is merely necessary to remark, that the statements it contains were corroborated by the opinion of every person present.


#### "SIMPSON'S PATENT SUBMERGED PROPELLER."

"On Monday afternoon an experimental steam trip of a highly interesting and satisfactory character, was made in a small steam boat, the Albion, of twenty-horse power, to test the working of a new method of propelling steam boats, the invention of Mr. Simpson. About two o'clock, the Janus, a government steam vessel, fitted with the engines and tubular boilers of the Earl of Dundonald, left Deptford dock yard with the noble Earl on board, on a short voyage down the river, to try the effect of certain alterations and repairs in the vessel's machinery, and, by his Lordship's invitation, the Albion kept company with the Janus on the excursion. A speed of eight knots an hour was attained by the Janus, but the increasing fog rendered it unadvisable to proceed further than Woolwich dockyard, and the Janus was left there, the Earl of Dundonald (who was accompanied by Sir J. Hill, Captain superintendent of Deptford dockyard, Captain Smithett, of the Garland steam vessel, Mr. W. R. O'Byrne, &c.) expressing a wish to return to town by Mr. Simpson's boat, in order the better to observe the operation of the patentee's new method of propulsion. The party on board the Albion included (in addition to the foregoing) Mr. Simpson, the patentee; Mr. R. H. Horne, Mr. Sill, Mr. R. Shute, and other scientific gentlemen; and the return voyage from Woolwich to Deptford was accomplished at an average speed of from ten to twelve knots an hour. The new propellers consist of wheels acting horizontally or vertically, in a case, entirely underneath the water. Those used in the Albion are constructed with four plain leaves or floats, fixed on a vertical shaft, surrounded by the case. This case is a concentric circle, rendered eccentric by its position with relation to the wheel, which it exceeds in size sufficiently to give effect to the centrifugal action of the water. The three problems, of the most effective method of supply, the delivery, and above all the best direction of the course of the water, appear to have been solved with great ingenuity by the patentee. The principle of the invention may, indeed, more briefly be stated to consist in the ejection of a column of water in a parallel line with that of the vessel's motion, which column acts against the water outside the vessel. The patentee's theory is, that as the wings of a bird act upon the air, which is beaten back as the bird flies onward, so these two submerged columns act as powerful water wings, beating back the denser mass of the water with invisible but irresistible force. Nothing, assuredly, can be more beautiful than the noiseless and mysterious motion of Mr. Simpson's boat. There is an entire absence of all surface swell, and the vessel steals rapidly through the water as if impelled by some magical or invisible agency. The Earl of Dundonald was pleased to express a high opinion of the value of the invention, more particularly in propelling boats upon canals and narrow rivers, and his Lordship further expressed a wish to see the new submerged propeller adapted to his own new rotary

engines and tubular boilers. We ought to mention that, by a beautiful contrivance, the case is constructed to change its position on the wheel being reversed, when it assumes the same form as for going a-head, and the wheel and case perform the same office as before with the greatest precision. The diameter of the submerged propeller wheels of the Albion is only 24 inches, and the wheels necessary to be used in a boat of 300 tons or 400 tons burden would not exceed 30 inches in diameter. This is one of the most extraordinary features of the invention, the diameter of paddle-wheels employed in steam-boats of similar tonnage being now nearly as many feet. The invention is one which cannot fail to attract the attention of the scientific world, and the general opinion yesterday was that the uninterrupted course of experiments conducted by the patentee with indefatigable perseverance, had at length perfected his invention and left nothing to be desired to ensure its success."

For the information of persons wishing to see for, and satisfy themselves, it may be stated the office of the propeller is at 5, Henrietta Street, Covent Garden.

The following diagrams will further explain the nature of the invention and the method of its application.



The above figure is an elevation of part of a boat's side, showing the position of the propeller and case as fixed for working.

FIG 2




Fig. 2 is a plan of the propeller with the cover removed, showing its peculiar construction.

The following letters of reference apply to both figures, though some of them are necessarily out of view in figure 1.

A is a vertical shaft which is connected by the ordinary method with the steam engine, and carries four, six, or more floats or blades; B B B B B B and C C are the top and bottom of the wheel case, which are supported and held together by means of the pillars F F F; and to which is attached by means of the links D D, the shifting shield E, which, guided by the links D D, upon the reversing of the wheel; assume the position indicated by the dotted lines. The water is admitted at the bottom or top of the case, or both, as occasion may require.

Fig. 3, on the next page, is an aft elevation of the propeller and case, as seen in the midship section of a canal boat. Fig. 4 is a plan of the propeller in the same relative position, showing the direction of the water when the propeller is in operation.



FIG 3





FIG 4



From the views given, it will be seen that Mr. Simpson's propeller completely obviates the disadvantages attaching to the paddle wheels and the screw, while under favourable circumstances it is calculated to rival either of them in point of power or speed. For canals, the amount of speed here indicated is not by any means necessary, four or five miles per hour being probably all that would be desirable in their present condition: whether a greater amount of speed however be practically judicious or not, the propeller, there is no doubt, possesses any requisite amount of capability in this respect, and combines with it those other qualifications which render it peculiarly suitable for canal navigation.

Unlike the ordinary paddle, the wheel of this propeller working horizontally instead of perpendicularly, has no back water to lift; and the economy of power thus effected implies an important amount of pecuniary saving. The water being admitted at the top and bottom of the wheel case, keeps the propeller continually supplied, which strikes it round the shifting shield, and from which it is thrown off in a current parallel to the side of the boat. Neither ground nor surface swell is thus produced, but merely a straight even current through the middle of the volume in which the propeller is immersed, and which subsides into comparatively still water by the time it reaches the aft part of the boat. No injury can result to the bottom or the banks, as no swell or commotion ever reaches them. The total immersion of the propeller saves the atmospheric resistance which paddle wheel vessels have to overcome.

Even should it be found, contrary to present experience, that *some* increase of injury would result to the canals from the adoption of this propeller; it would still possess an unquestionable balance of advantages over the present method of towing. It would render towing paths unnecessary, and would save the continual expenditure for repairs which they require. Four or five boats, or even more, if necessary, might be towed by one tug; and the men employed in it would take charge of the whole fleet, by which pillage would be prevented, men's labour—to the extent of three men to each boat—saved, and the cabin-room, which now occupies a considerable portion of every boat, thrown into the space appropriated to cargo. Double the present average rate of speed might be adopted, without any increase of injury to the canals; while the substitution of cheap and efficient mechanical power, for the expensive, uncertain, inefficient and destructive employment of horses, would of itself effect an amount of saving more than doubly equivalent to any additional toll its introduction might incur.

The regular traffic between London and Birmingham is performed by boats which travel night and day, called "flys;" the remainder is

done by "slows," which travel only in the day time, are hired for special occasions, and at irregular intervals.

The "flies" number about twenty-eight per week each way,—fifty-six boats in all. The horses are changed three times during the distance, and the journey is expected to be performed in about sixty hours, being rather more than two-and-a-half miles per hour; each boat has generally three men.

These fifty-six boats are worked by about one hundred horses, including one or two extra, which are kept at the various stables, to supply cases of failure or accident.

The horsing is calculated to cost about 4d. per mile, or 26s. per week each horse; the steerer's wages about 3½d. per mile. The original cost of one hundred horses, at the low average of £25 each, would be £2,500.

Five tug boats, each ten-horse power, fitted with Mr. Simpson's propeller, each towing four boats—one or two always at either end, and two on the way—would do the whole of this work; the departure from one end being supplied each day by an arrival from the other end. The propeller travelling at the rate of four miles per hour, including stoppages, would accomplish the distance in thirty-nine hours; being little more than half the time at present occupied by the horses.

The original cost of a tug boat, with ten-horse power engine, boiler, and propeller complete, is estimated at about £400. Two men and a boy would be required for its management, the salaries of whom might be—engine-driver 40s. per week, stoker 30s. boy 15s. to 20s.

The consumption of coals is calculated to be about three-fourths of a ton per day of twelve hours; the cost may be taken at 20s. per ton.

The following are the results deducible from these premises:—

#### COMPARATIVE ORIGINAL OUTLAY.

	£	s.	d.
Original cost of 100 horses, @ £25 each.....	2,500	0	0
Ditto of 5 tug boats, with engines, boilers, propellers, &c., complete, @ £400 each .....	2,000	0	0
Difference, being amount of saving in favour of propeller.....	£500	0	0

#### COMPARATIVE EXPENSE OF WORKING.

Cost of "keep" of 100 horses, comprising hay, corn, stable rent, straw (litter) collar-making, shoeing, hostler, and towing-ropes, @ 26s. per week ... ..	190	0	0
Steerer's wages,—48 boats, @ 3½d. per mile, for 156 miles .....	117	0	0
Total .....	£247	0	0

Consumption of coals by 5 tug boats, @ 15s. per day of 12 hours, (leaving out 24 hours for intervals of rest) per week.....	£45 0 0	
Salaries; engine-drivers £2, stokers 30s. boys 20s....	22 10 0	
		67 10 0

Difference, being amount of weekly saving to be effected by the propeller .....	£179 10 0
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*deduct*  
It is strange indeed if this enormous rate of weekly saving—nearly 75 per cent. of the working expenditure—would not pay for whatever additional toll might be charged upon the introduction of the propeller, and allow such a reduction of freight into the bargain, as would, in connection with the other cotemporary improvements, enable the canals to withstand any effort of competition by the railways, and to regain their original condition of prosperous utility.

The developement of the plan of the “merchants and manufacturers’ union” will present facilities for the application of this propeller which did not previously exist.

Other propellers have, from time to time been proposed, which, although not boasting the same degree of perfection that has now been obtained, might still have been brought into use, were it possible to procure for them such an amount of steady and continual employment, as would have enabled the owners to pay the high rate of toll the canal companies would charge for any additional injury they might have occasioned to the banks.

No carrier however could be found to employ them, for no one had sufficient cargo to supply them with the necessary four or five boats at a time to any given place. Could any arrangements have been entered into for collecting the whole of the goods for one place from the various rival carriers, there might have been accumulated sufficient cargo to sustain the propeller on the line to that place; but this was an impossibility; and even if it were not so, its inconvenience would prevent its being continued as a system,—and the total failure of every such propeller has been the result.

Suppose there is a propeller proved to occasion even less wear and tear of the canal than the present working by horses occasions, and calculated to tow four or five boats at a time, at a speed of four to five miles per hour; how can it be supplied at present, constantly and regularly, as it must be, with this number of boats going in the same direction? Where is the carrier who can load this number of boats regularly—say once every day—to any given destination? Yet this must be done in order to work it profitably; and in proportion as the number of boats which can be supplied to it diminishes, the relative expense increases.

The only manner in which such a number of boats can be got together at present, by any one establishment, is by filling one boat first and *delaying* it until a second, and third, and fourth are filled, accordingly as goods arrive. This delay, however, is one of the great evils to be remedied ; so that the accumulation of four or five boats in this way, by diminishing the times of starting, would lead to worse delays than are now experienced, and would not, therefore, be admissible. But even if it be contended that this accumulation is possible under the conditions stated, *how many* persons are there who can do it ? And if one carrier be found who is competent, to *how many places* can he guarantee this amount of traffic ? It has been before stated, and it is well known, that the majority of carriers possess but one, two, or three boats per week to the various places to which they ply, and that the gross trade of each is made up of a portion of the trade of various places, for possession of which he contends with a number of rivals ; no one carrier possessing the exclusive traffic of any one town or district of any importance.

The general practical adoption of any such propeller, would, under these circumstances, be an impossibility ; and hence, the altering and adapting of those circumstances to the requirements of so desirable a means of towing, must be the first step in raising the canals from a state of exclusive dependence upon inadequate animal power, to one of general and hearty adoption of a suitable mechanical substitute.

What these circumstances are which require alteration, and the means for its accomplishment as proposed by the "Merchants and Manufacturers' Union," have already been explained.

The traffic of Birmingham, for instance, would be "let out," so to speak, to the person who guaranteed to do it upon the most advantageous terms, (every thing considered.) The most convenient place would be selected as a *dépôt* for all London goods ; another place (the most convenient also) for Liverpool ; and other *dépôts* for the various other places ;—all, however, under the same management, working upon the same system, and responsible to the same central authority, appointed by *the owners of the goods* to look after their interests.

Go no further than this for instances of benefits, and there are sufficient to convince any person who is not wilfully incredulous. At the very first step, before the goods are out of the possession of the owners, there is a division of them which would of itself almost do away with the possibility of error in destination or delivery, each package being deposited at the wharf or place exclusively devoted to the goods of a particular district, instead of being left at the wharf of a "general carrier," who takes in goods for a dozen different places ; and where it is in danger of being sent, as is often the case, hundreds of

miles out of its road. How *could* a London package, under this system be sent to Liverpool, or any other wrong destination, unless purposely?

It is here also, that the utility of the propeller is most apparent. Each town or district has the benefit of the concentration of its traffic, by which the propeller is constantly, fully, and profitably employed; while communication becomes more frequent, more speedy, and more economical, and the business inevitably more correctly performed.

Unlike other great changes, *this* will not necessarily be injurious to any interest that it touches. The carriers are the parties who will undergo the greatest changes; but they will not necessarily be injured; on the contrary, many of them will ultimately be very materially benefitted. Facilities and improvements have always had the effect of increasing the trade to which they were applied; and it may be presumed a contrary effect will not be produced in the present case. An increase of traffic upon the canals will require a proportionate number of boats and hands, and greater activity may be expected to prevail. It is true the principle of centralisation will require some of the carriers to take nominally subordinate positions, the same in fact that they already occupy in reference to the railways; but these positions will not necessarily imply a less amount of remuneration, but may, owing to the quantity of business which will be centered in their hands, and the diminution of expense, be made consistent with a greater amount of profit than that of the most extensive straggling business which any carrier now possesses.

Notwithstanding this, persons will be found who will view these changes with disrelish simply because they are changes. Classes, as well as individuals, dislike to be "put out of their way." This way may be both absurd and injurious, yet will it be adhered to with a degree of tenacity proportionate to the length of time it has been uninterruptedly followed. The great evil of this adherence to a particular habit is, that it begets an involuntary method of acting; and in proportion as this gains strength, the habit of specific thinking becomes less frequent and more feeble. Persons who, of themselves, will scarcely even *think*, can seldom be made to *reason* against even the most obvious prejudices attaching to themselves. Their good may be in view of the most ordinary impartial vision, yet will subtle prejudice overlay it with an impenetrable mist, which will obscure it from the unreasoning observer.

But what then? Are the fancied interests of a few to obstruct the real and important interests of the many? Will the crotchets of half a dozen unreasoning people, who resolutely persist in standing still, while the world around them is moving gradually onward, be allowed to interrupt the general march of improvement? Common sense will

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